Recent studies have proposed different approaches to mitigate the risk of overload and failure in Software-Defined Networks (SDNs). Some of these approaches have proven effective but only in specific use cases, making it potentially difficult to generalize their application. Furthermore, network failure detection and recovery by the SDN control plane requires sophisticated software logic running on multiple controllers that are non-intrusive to the network environment. While this allows more flexibility to respond to failure events, it also implies that each controller application must include its recovery logic, which increases code complexity. In this paper, we propose a fast fail-over technique for solving the problem of a controller failure or target availability in the network. We argue that inter-domain controller synchronization can result in high network overhead and should be minimized to per-need base only. To this end, upon detecting a failure in the control plane, the proposed fast failure recovery technique leverages a load-shifting scheme to initialize alternate paths and proactively instantiate flow rules to reduce flow setup latency. To prevent packet loss during failure recovery, we utilize a forwarding information table that quickly replays inputs to the controller after failure recovery. Our extensive experiments show that the average latency incurred by the controller to controller communication is approximately twice that of per-need based synchronization. The experimental results also show that our proposed technique achieved a 50% reduction in service interruption period and 75% flow_mod reduction during a single link failure over the traditional SDN baseline approach.
I. INTRODUCTION
Within the past decade, the concept of Software-Defined Networking (SDN) has evolved from a simple idea [11] , [19] to a new networking paradigm that aims to tackle issues in legacy networks, i.e., vendor dependency and management complexity. Because of the flexibility of the SDN architecture that enables the separation of the control plane from the data plane (contrary to their concurrency in legacy routers), a set of features including centralized management, programmable control plane, vendor neutrality among others are now available to network operators.
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Another essential component that is often associated with SDN is OpenFlow [38] , the de facto southbound interface protocol. OpenFlow allows direct interaction with the forwarding plane of network devices through a well-defined Application Programming Interface (API). This interaction can be achieved in two approaches, namely, proactive flow programming and reactive flow programming. While both approaches can be adopted synchronously, the latter presents a mechanism for processing real-time traffic at the data plane, and the former enables static network programming before traffic reaches the data plane based on pre-existing flow rules. The reactive approach is more desired in a dynamic network environment. However, the cost of computation is high when compared to the proactive approach. In the proactive mode, traffic incident on the data plane of an SDN environment requires a match-else-request process since the switch node needs to first check the flow entries within its flow table to find a matching entry. Otherwise, it will send a request to the SDN controller seeking instructions on how to determine the appropriate action for the packet. Upon receiving a new packet_in request, the controller responds by installing a new flow rule on the reference switch.
In a large network, the computational overhead involved in evaluating every new packet arrival event in the network may cause the reference controller to be overwhelmed. In an attempt to resolve this issue, studies [30] , [42] , [47] , [60] , [64] have proposed different distributed controller architectures to reduce the computational overhead and avert a single-pointof-failure problem in the traditional SDN architecture.
A failure occurs when a component(s) of the network is unable to correctly deliver service due to link/node malfunction or malicious activities on the network. In traditional networks, failure is mostly associated with link or node failures [62] . However, the logically centralized control and programmable interfaces offered in SDN are leveraged to resolve many fault management issues that exist today. For example, a consistent global view of an entire network can add many possibilities to the process of fault localization [34] , [35] . Therefore, reducing the latency of the failure recovery process and the overhead associated with the consistent global view requirements in the SDN controller has gained much interest in the SDN research community [13] , [39] .
Indeed, failure management is one of the fundamental tools that enable network operators to provide uninterrupted communication services in the event of a link or node failure. Furthermore, failure of a link/node can also be as a result of security exploits on the SDN network. However, these security exploits vary from one SDN controller type to another depending on their associated vulnerabilities. For example, a typical SDN network is susceptible to different kinds of vulnerability depending on the control flow operations in reference. These control flow operations are of three types depending on the operational mode, namely symmetric, asymmetric, and intra-controller control flow operations.
The example illustrated in Figure 1 represents the operational difference between symmetric and asymmetric control flow. The load balancer application within the controller requires switch statistics information to distribute traffic loads efficiently. Consequently, to retrieve traffic information, the load balancer first initiates a statistic request event to the statistics service in the event handler, i.e., dotted line 1. Once initiated, the statistic service sends STATS_REQUEST OpenFlow message to the switch, i.e., dotted line 2. Next, the switch includes its statistics in the STATS_RESPONSE OpenFlow message to the statistics service in the controller (dotted line 3), which in turn sends it to the load balancer application, i.e., dotted line 4. In contrast to the symmetric control flow, asymmetric control flow operation references SDN operations that require unidirectional request messages with no response obligation (e.g., control requests for handling a new packet arrival that are sent to a controller for inserting the flow entry in the network device as an event response) illustrated with the solid lines in Figure 1 . Besides, when the switch receives a packet, it first matches it with the flow entries in its flow table. If the match returns NULL (i.e., no matching flow entries), a portion of the packet header is embedded in a PACKET_IN message sent to the controller. Then, the routing module on the controller uses the flow rule service in its event handler to push a FLOW_MOD message containing a new rule to be installed in the switch table.
Contrary to the other two control flow operations, the intracontroller operations are initiated by applications running on a controller (e.g., a DHCP application requesting topology information). Further, this type of operation can be achieved by interacting with a reference application responsible for computing the current topology or by making use of internal APIs provided by the controller.
We foresee in the nearest future, a self-sufficient SDN platform that adheres to the open-source promise of SDN. Hence, in our previous work [3] , we proposed a Proactive Load Shift (PLS) technique that augments the traditional SDN architecture with a shim layer. This shim layer diminishes the complexities posed by existing load balancing techniques. PLS has two modes of operations, namely, passive (standby) and active modes. In the passive mode, the secondary (backup) controller only listens without processing for packet_in messages sent to the current master. While in the active mode, the controller is allowed to process all events created by the associated switches. Based on the promising results obtained from PLS, we can further harness the power of a collaborative shim layer to develop various network applications controlled and managed by the shim layer in a manner transparent to the control plane.
Extensive research in the area of failure detection and recovery has mostly been attributed to controller placement (i.e., to minimize an associative switch to controller latency) with very few consideration for link failures, or extending OpenFlow switches to encompass a semi-independent routing prowess to reduce the workload on the controller in the event of a failure. In this paper, we present a fast failover technique to detect and recover from a failure in the link(s)/node of a distributed SDN control plane. In comparison with the fast-failover mechanism now available on the more recent versions of OpenFlow [48] , which we refer to as Distributed Controller (DC) (see Section V), our solution ensures a faster recovery period for the network to converge. During detection, the fast fail-over technique leverages the capability of our previous work in [2] to redirect traffic load to other controllers. This paper presents the following contributions:
• We propose a failure detection and recovery module as extensions to our previous work to handle fault management in the event of unplanned link or controller node down events while maintaining a consistent state of the network.
• We propose a prototype that extends the functionality of OpenFlow protocol on data plane switches to respond to acknowledgment requests for each batch of updates sent from their reference controller. This is essential to improve the efficiency of the control plane nodes while processing resource-intensive events for the data plane.
With an ACK-enabled OpenFlow protocol, controllers can exercise a definite wait time during batch updates. Also, such mechanism can prevent network congestion and unnecessary strangulation of resources due to many sessions opened in the network.
• We prove that from a network state if the number of failed controller nodes is less than or equal to half of the currently active controllers, our prototype can converge the network to a new state of consistency. We define consistency properties guaranteed by the proposed fast fail-over technique and compare the efficiency of our technique to existing techniques using various case studies.
• We implemented the proposed controller modules on our existing PLS shim layer [3] for the validation and evaluation of our new model. To evaluate the efficiency of our fail-over technique, our system recovers within time O(F c ) while for the link failure our system recovery time is O(F c * d), where F c represent the number of failed controller(s) and d represents the distance (number of hops) from a switch to its reference controller (d = 1 since each switch is associated to an active controller and a passive fail-over controller. 1 Therefore, both link and node failures can recover within the same computational time. While our work is not the first to consider a fail-over design for distributed SDN controller architecture, to the best of our knowledge we are the first to consider abstracting such functionality from the control plane to a shim layer with a seamless awareness of the current state of the network at every point in time.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. We summarize the related works in Section II. Section III details our motivation and problem formulation. Section IV describes the system architecture including internal operations. Section V details our testbed environment, results, and discusses the efficiency of our approach. Conclusion and future work are provided in Section VI.
II. RELATED WORK
In SDN, we attribute most of the communication overhead to asymmetric control flow operations due to the rate of packet arrival events in the network during regular operating hours [64] . Although, numerous efforts have been directed towards exploiting SDN flexibility and programmability to address different vulnerabilities presented in the conventional SDN architecture, some of these issues (e.g., packet_in flooding [31] , [57] , flow rule flooding [14] , [61] ) have evolved with the continuous upward trend in networking technologies, and thereby rendering previous efforts ineffective.
In existing SDN literature, different approaches have been used to design fault-tolerant systems for SDN controller architecture. One of such designs involves the use of a partition and selection scheme to address a controller placement problem in SDN [20] . In order to maximize the success rate of switches to controller association, an inter-dependent network is used to analyze link failures and its impact on controller placement, and generally on the network resilience. Zhang et al. [63] proposed a controller placement scheme based on a min-cut algorithm to split the network into partitions. The scheme assigns each network partition to a controller to minimize the likelihood of a switch to controller disassociation. In [39] , the proposed scheme leverages the multi-path capability of the network to maximize the connectivity between switches and controller(s). Hu et al. [21] presented mathematical modeling based on integer linear programming to minimize the dissociation of switches from their reference controllers. The authors prove the computational complexity of the problem by mapping it to the domination set problem and propose different heuristics to reduce the time required to solve the problem significantly.
Similarly, to reduce the cost of using a controller placement strategy to improve fault-tolerant in SDN, Ros and Ruiz [49] used a reliability constraint on each SDN switch. This ensures that the probability of a valid association path between a switch and its corresponding controller is higher than a given threshold. Further, the authors in [51] focused on reducing some portion of the cost incurred by installing and connecting the controllers, and the cost of the switch to controller association within a network. To this end, all the above work focused on using different controller placement strategies either to maximize/minimize the association/dissociation or to reduce the cost of the network.
Another research direction focused on maintaining a consistent Network Information Base (NIB) by distributing network state information among controllers [8] , [30] . Despite the shared database among controllers, each application is required to define which information to synchronize (i.e., NIB). However, access to this information needs to be structured in a manner that ensures a consistent view across the controllers. Furthermore, the authors in [9] proposed SMaRtLight based on a replicated shared database. The shared database leverages the fault-tolerant capability of Replicated State Machines (RSMs) to create a backup of the Network Information Base (NIB) based on a defined initial state and allowable transition on the states. In a later implementation of their work [10] , the authors propose a more robust architecture to ensure a stronger consistency by using BFT-SMaRt consensus algorithm. To further increase the performance of their solution, their implementation substantially reduces the number of references within the data store by using a cross-reference table.
Hyperflow [60] implements a centralized control plane logic within a distributed physical control plane to ensure a network-wide consistency among the controllers. It uses a publish/subscribe scheme to manage events that can affect the current state of the network. Consequently, this architecture requires SDN applications running on top of the controller to be modified to tolerate temporal out-of-order events.
Ravana [27] proposed a lightweight switch-side mechanism that provides a transparent slave-master fault tolerance model for centralized controllers. This architecture considers the entire event processing cycle as a transaction such that either all-or-none of the components are executed. The correctness guarantee of the system requires that each event/command is buffered on the switch before forwarding to the corresponding switch or controller. Although Ravana enforces strong consistency guarantees as compared to other relevant works that focus on fault-tolerant systems, the exactly-once semantics for processing network events requires that the reference failed system be unavailable. For this reason, it is hard to generalize the solution to use-cases where a rogue controller remains visible to its replicas but unresponsive to data plane events [33] .
While the existing literature on fault-tolerant SDN controllers focuses on either using a distributed controller approach or the Master-Slave controllers approach (see Figure 2 ), our system integrates the master-slave approach into distributed controller approach with the management of a shim layer posing as an intermediary between the control plane and the data plane. Although the masterslave approach seems to be the simplified approach for faulttolerant SDN controllers, this is arguably non-trivial in the case of Replicated State Machines (RSM) implementation of a fault-tolerant system. To ensure consistency in such systems, it requires the use of a shared datastore to provide a global NIB [9] , [44] . However, based on the implementation presented in [9] , it shows that frequent access to the datastore can have a high impact on the controller throughput over time (i.e., approximately five times reduction in throughput).
Most of the works mentioned above focused more on detection or a combination of detection and recovery of the system when a failure occurs. However, other research interests focused mainly on failure recovery in SDN. One of the pioneering researches in that area is the work of Staessens et. al. [59] that analyzed the case of restoration by provisioning the controller with network resources to monitor link status on the network. Their work also showed the nontriviality involved in ensuring fast recovery duration in large networks. 2 Also, in [54] , the authors focused on using a reactive approach that computes a new path for the affected packets and then deletes the old path from the switches' flow entries in that order. Another work [28] proposed an endto-end path protection scheme that extends the OpenFlow 1.1 with monitoring functionality on the switches to reduce the controller's processing latency. Further, they combined the function with OpenFlow fast-failover feature to allow nodes to autonomously react to failures by switching to a precomputed end-to-end secondary path.
In a related study [34] , the authors propose a centralized monitoring system and a model to reduce the number of iterations required to monitor the entire network links. This approach only supports link failure even though such failures can also be generalized to node failure detection in the event of a total link failure on a node. In our approach, we ensure the optimal recovery time by extending the functionality of the OpenFlow protocol to use an aggregate ACK-enabled function to enable switches to send an acknowledgment to their reference controller after each completed update. Hence, our approach enables the reference controller to only wait for a definite period to reduce the amount of resources held by different sessions in the network.
Although the presence of a barrier mechanism in OpenFlow may cause some confusion as to why we require an acknowledgment mechanism instead of using the existing mechanism. However, the OpenFlow protocol does not specify any positive acknowledgment that an update was performed in the data plane [45] . With the barrier mechanism in OpenFlow, the only way to deduce such information is to rely on the barrier command. As described in [40] , after receiving a barrier request in the form of OFPT _BARRIER_REQUEST message from the controller, the switch has finished processing all previously received messages before executing any message after the barrier request. When the process is complete, the switch must send a barrier reply message in the form of OFPT _BARRIER_REPLY message. However, they further experimented on OpenFlow compatible hardware switches, and the results show that updates are often applied in the switches hundreds of milliseconds after a barrier that confirms them has been sent to the controller. Nonetheless, the practicality of using the barrier message may cause inaccuracy in the controller's response time since some OpenFlow agents do not support the barrier command, as observed by Rotsos et al. [50] . Therefore, the barrier mechanism does not provide explicit acknowledgment to the controller for control messages sent to the data plane. Instead, it allows the controller a wait time for the switch to execute all batch update received before processing any other message. This approach can stall other time-sensitive packets incident on the switch from being forwarded. Whereas, with an explicit acknowledgment, the switch is allowed to process other traffic alongside the control traffic based on the set priority.
Some other works have utilized either in-band or out-ofband control channels in the design of failure resilient systems based on their system requirements. Commonly, a controller interacts with data plane devices via out-of-band control [1] in a dedicated network [25] , [53] . The two main advantages of out-of-band control are (i) Remote access to the controller via dedicated communication port in the occurrence of failure event in the data plane and, (ii) the high-security advantage of a dedicated management port for control signals. However, the cost implication of building such a dedicated out-ofband network could be very expensive as a result of high resource utilization. An alternative way is to implement a less resource-intensive in-band control [36] for constructing the control plane, especially in a large network with hundreds or thousands of forwarding devices. The in-band control channel utilizes a multi-hop routing path consisting of intermediate relays to forward a control message via Transport Control Protocol (TCP) or Transport Layer Security (TLS) to a data plane device.
One of the first works to examine the resilience of in-band control in SDN is Baheshti and Zhang [7] , where the authors define a protection metric to evaluate resilience algorithms for the best protection scheme. However, the authors did not address how to proactively install alternate routes and the scalability of the in-band network. Sharma et al. [55] , [56] compared the protection and recovery approaches for inband OpenFlow networks and concluded that only protection grants a recovery period under the required 50 ms as stipulated by Multiprotocol Lable Switching Transport Profile (MPLS-TP) requirements for network restoration after failure detection with spans less than approximately 746 miles [41] . A recent work by Lopez-Pajares et al. [37] , proposed Amaru, a protocol that provides plug-and-play resilient in-band control for SDN with low-complexity and high scalability. The protocol uses hierarchical labeling to mask MAC address (c) represents a total link failure on a controller node that shows the communication barrier between switches 's1' and 's2' and their reference controller 'c1'. Also, we observe a switch 's3' with a severed link to its backup controller 'c1'.
to simplify the routing tables and minimize the number of entries to one per path. Further, to address scalability, Amaru reduces network convergence time, number of exchanged messages, and table entries for in-band control routing. Other usages of in-band control channel can be found in wired networks [22] , or wireless networks [23] , [52] .
III. MOTIVATION AND PROBLEM FORMULATION
Most of the existing link failure models are well suited for handling specific problem scenarios. Figure 3 shows a multi-link failure which combines the aforementioned scenarios. Hence in this section, we discuss our motivation based on these link failure scenarios, extended the problem to node failure models, and propose a robust model that is independent of the control plane and data plane modification requirement of related works.
A. MOTIVATION
The importance of a fast and reliable fail-over system in a distributed SDN controller environment is non-trivial, especially for production environments that require time-sensitive failure recovery systems. To achieve such a requirement, a proactive approach like the shim layer implemented in [2] for balancing workload in a distributed SDN controller environment can be instrumental in laying out the foundation for such a system. In this paper, we focus on a fast, reliable link/node failure detection and an efficient, proactive failure recovery in a distributed SDN controller environment while guaranteeing key consistency properties. First, we measure the cost of PLS on a distributed SDN controller architecture and compare our results with a benchmark architecture. Second, we model the failure problem and bound our solution to the depth of our research. Lastly, we compare our system to other state-of-the-art approaches using different scenarios. [2] is active (i.e. during load shift from controller 3 to controller 2) and passive (i.e. during network monitoring on controller 1) on the reference controllers 1, 2, 3 and 0 (without PLS running) with 32 switches each and 1024 maximum requests.
In Figure 4 , we show the cumulative distribution (CDF) of the response time across three Floodlight controllers augmented with our PLS shim layer and a fourth controller running native Floodlight controller. We observed that when PLS is in passive mode, the amount of network resources utilized is negligible (i.e., controller 0 and controller 1). This is because the PLS shim layer focuses on three types of load statistics, namely, (1) forwarding rules sent by the controller as flow table entries (FTE), (2) average control message arrival rate (avg(M ) t ), and (3) round trip time (RTT ) of packet_in messages sent from switch m to controller n. To calculate the load on a controller, we use the following equation described in [2] .
where w 1 , w 2 , w 3 are weighted coefficients of the three factors respectively with a total sum of 1. The weighted coefficients are generated based on the influence of each operand in the equation (see Section V-B). This method is not intrusive for packets transmitted between the switches and the controllers. Although the controller 2 experienced a slightly higher latency during the load shift, it is easy to find out that the response time variation is negligible. However, for controller 3, the latency incurred can be attributed to the high workload from its associated switches, which normalizes at the end of the load shift. Further, the slightly low response rate occurs temporarily until the network converges back to a steady-state. The response time observed on controller 2 is slightly higher than when the shim layer is in passive mode or when running a native Floodlight controller. Hence, an augmented shim layer assisting the controller with network event orchestration (i.e., balancing the workload on the controllers) can be instrumental in minimizing communication latency between the control plane and the data plane. Besides, the load-balancer in [3] uses a heavy-hitter detection algorithm to analyze switches' statistics to detect switches with high network resource utilization on packet_in events causing resource strangulation on the reference controller. We can adopt both methodologies to transition a controller's role on the switches from 'Master' to 'Slave' or vice versa in the event of a controller node failure. We further show in Figure 5 the request dynamics on a selected number of switches connected to controller 3 based on our PLS prototype Heavy Hitter Detection sub-module (HHD). By using a randomized packet_in generator to push varied sizes of flows to the switches connected to controller 3, we were able to initiate a stress condition. For clarity, we set a flow threshold (i.e., blue dash line in Figure 5 ) for the switches based on the number of resources available on the reference controller to avoid race conditions between the switches. This threshold is used to identify which of the switches associated with the controller is responsible for the resource strangulation. Also, the HHD module can be used to detect unusual activities on the data plane, such as a denial-of-service attack targeting a particular data path. Therefore, we can leverage the features of the HHD algorithm in our failure detection system alongside the Resource Fair Share theorem in [2] to ensure that the workload recipient (synonymous to controller 2) is not overwhelmed.
B. CONSISTENCY PROPERTIES
Previous literature has proven that in order for an SDN controller to possess fault-tolerant and high-availability features in a virtualized environment, active and passive replication 3 two conventional techniques, namely, active and passive replication can be leveraged to achieve this [28] . In general, active replication may be an alternative solution to achieving the requirements mentioned above since it offers high resilience and negligible downtown [18] . However, the consequence of implementing an active replication solution in a large distributed network is the high resource cost on the control plane as a result of each switch's request being processed by all the controllers. This solution may easily introduce inconsistency of the network image among the controllers due to event reordering imposed by delay differences (i.e., different controller response times due to network diameter factors like distance between nodes and general network congestion). Contrary to the non-determinism of real-world control systems, active replication assumes that all the processes hosted by the controller are always deterministic. On the other hand, the passive replication solution may result in a single point of failure in the network since the replication process depends on the availability of the primary controller to maintain a consistent view of the network. Both solutions, even though widely used, have undesirable consequences for SDN.
The use of a shim layer in collaboration with the control plane to orchestrate the management of network events can improve resource management, and avoid excessive duplication of events. Duplication of network events may occur in a distributed SDN controller network, especially during failure recovery. The shim layer has an unbiased view of the network while monitoring events transacted between the data plane and the control plane. In the event of a controller failure, the shim layer sends the current state of the network to the new master controller to ensure network consistency during failure recovery. Following from the consistency properties used in Ravana, Table 1 shows the comparison of our proposed Fast Fail-over Distributed Controller (FFDC) technique with other fault-tolerant controller solutions. Even though both Ravana and FFDC have similar properties, our work offers a less complicated and more efficient synthesis of the consistency properties that allow more flexibility on the controllers to handle events. To show the consistency guaranteed by FFDC, we simulated and compared the following consistency properties.
1) TOTAL EVENT ORDERING
In RSMs, if switches were to broadcast their every event to every controller on a network provisioned with limited resources, then an undesired race condition becomes eminent. Even worse, every controller replica builds its application state on the stream of events it receives until it fails or during planned maintenance, which consequently leads to inconsistent event ordering alongside the overhead incurred on the switches. The proposed FFDC uses a combined distributed controller approach with the master-slave approach by considering physically distributed controllers but logically centralized management. Following the illustration in Figure 6 (a), we have a network orchestrated with a master and a slave controller, both with the capability of ensuring ordered routing of new flows to assigned paths. There are two disjoint paths in the network (i.e., s1 -> s2 and s1 -> s2 -> s3) with 5Mbps capacity each. Now consider two flows F1 and F2 with demands of 5M and 3M , respectively, are incident on the network at different times. The master controller maintains the same path for each packet within a flow. If a third flow F3 with a demand of 3M becomes incident on the network, the FFDC tries to balance the three flows on the two available paths using a First-in First-out (FIFO) method while guaranteeing the order in which the events are presented to the network.
Further, if we simulate a scenario in which the master controller fails while the current events are yet to be completed, the slave controller role changes to master on the associated switches. In the case of RSMs, the new master/replica will only have the view of the network for events already completed in the network with no information on the current events, which may lead to improper handling of the packets in flight associated with the current flows. Consequently, packets from F3 will be spread across the two available paths. However, this leads to congestion on the path utilized by flow F1 as the master/replica state diverges from the actual state of the failed master/replica. Hence, both F1 and F2's window size (i.e., referenced TCP window size) will shrink in excess to accommodate the newer flow F3. However, because FFDC maintains the current view of the network at every point in time, also the slave controller is privy to the last events processed by the master before failure, a replay of the events is not required except if the event processing on the switches fails. Interestingly, flow F1 with the higher demand shrinks its window size dynamically to accommodate the newer flow F3 without affecting the bandwidth demand of F3 provided that F3 carries the higher priority. We then show the comparison of the measured flow bandwidths for the switch broadcast and FFDC in Figures 7(a) and 7(b). The simulation result shows that FFDC is capable of keeping the state information of the controllers in the network. Hence, we can guarantee no packet_out nor events lost during the transition and subsequent convergence of the network state.
2) EXACTLY-ONCE EVENT DELIVERY
In SDN, logging of events by the control plane is an important part of failure recovery. From our literature, we highlight three different approaches used to ensure consistent ordering of events, namely, (i) the use of external consistent storage system (i.e., Onix and ONOS), or (ii) the use of RSM protocols to ensure the controller's internal state, or (iii) the use of a lightweight switch-side mechanism with RSM protocols to guarantee correctness (e.g., Ravana). The first approach may fail to ensure network state consistency if the master fails during the execution of an event. The second approach may fail to update the event log if the master fails immediately after receiving the event. The third approach builds upon the second approach with a lightweight switch side mechanism to ensure a consistent view of the network. However, the time it takes for the switches to update their current state on the new controller may add a substantial cost to the network convergence time. The proposed FFDC approach maintains a current state of both the control plane and the data plane such that in the event of a failure, the new master controller updates his current state via the FFDC, which reduces the convergence time by almost half of the third approach.
As illustrated in Figure 6 (b), consider a controller program that runs a shortest-path routing algorithm (Appendices VI). If the master (M) installed a new route for a flow from s1 to s2 on switch s1 but the update to switch s2 failed. Assuming the master failed before replicating the failed update event to switch s2. If the controller replicas are implemented based on the tradition RSM protocol, such a failure event will be lost to the new master/replica. Such failure can lead to an inconsistent view of the network by the new master/replica, which then implies that the traffic affected by the failure event can not be rerouted around the failed link. In comparison to traditional RSMs, Ravana's switch side mechanism allows the switches to update their state on the new master, which eventually leads to a consistent view of the network and consequent rerouting of the affected traffic around the failed switch. Our approach commits all the current events running on the network on the FFDC, which consequently updates the new view of the network on the new master, ensuring a faster recovery of the network to a consistent convergence state.
In Figure 7 (c), we measure and compare the bandwidth utilization of FFDC, Ravana and RSMs with respect to a new flow originating from srcHost to destination host (dstHost) on path s1->s2. We simulated RSM protocol running on a network with unmodified OpenFlow switches to capture the response time to bandwidth utilization during a simultaneous failure event. First, the link between the master/replica and switch s2 failed at E1 before the new rule can be processed at the switch. Second, the master/replica failed before it can replicate the event E1. Because the new master/replica is unaware of event E1, it maintains the view of the network inherited from the failed master. Ravana, on the other hand, recognizes event E1 and adjusted the new controller's view of the network to an eventually consistent state at t3. The proposed FFDC converged quicker than Ravana at time t2 (i.e., (t 2 − t 1 ) < (t 3 − t 1 ) where t 3 > t 2 > t 1 ). The FFDC maintains a consistent state of the network without incurring additional modification of neither the control nor data plane.
3) EXACTLY-ONCE COMMAND EXECUTION
Following the first two consistency properties, we can infer that each command sent from the controller to the switches is being captured by FFDC and replayed in the event of a link or controller node failure. Consider a controller application that failed right after sending an unsuccessful command to instruct the switch to delete the flow rule for routing flows from 10.1.0.5 with priority 1, and add a new rule to route every flow from 10.0.0.0/24 subnet with priority 6 as illustrated in Figure 6 (c). Since the controller failed before receiving the failed signal from the previously sent command, we utilize the FFDC to update the view on the new master. The master then replays the command before processing new events on the network. In a naive scenario, the command would be lost in the network without following this process.
C. PROBLEM FORMULATION
We provide an overview of a Distributed Controller SDN (DC-SDN) architecture with the control plane comprising a set C = {c 1 , . . . , c n } of n physically distributed controllers, the data plane consisting of a set S = {s 1 , . . . , s m } of m virtual switches. The communication pipeline between the data plane and the control plane consists of a set L = {l 1 , . . . , l k } of k links. Each switch m ∈ S stores a set of rules installed by its reference controller 4 to define which packet should be forwarded through which ports. There are two operational modes of control channel as discussed in Section II.
A general belief is that out-of-band operational mode is simpler to implement and more resilient than the in-band operational mode. Contrary to this belief, the findings of Panda et al. [43] suggests that depending on the design and configuration of the operational mode, a naive out-of-band may offer lower resilience than the in-band operational mode. While SDN can support both operational modes, most of the existing literature only use out-of-bound control even though the in-band mode allows for a guaranteed quicker network update. In this work, we trade off the simplicity of out-ofband for the quick update advantage of in-band operational mode [4] , [12] . As summarized in [37] , in-band control can easily scale with the size of the network without incurring high routing cost, and less prone to congestion due to the high capacity nature of the data plane links when compared to the out-of-band control. Further, the resiliency of in-band networks to link failure comes with no extra cost (i.e., providing secondary paths) since both data path and control path share the same link. However, the cost of resilience in the out-of-band networks is higher since the control messages are restrained to a single route per deployment. For clarity, we do not make any assumption about the hosts' network service, except for that traffic from a host H attached to a switch m can traverse the network. 4 Reference controller is the switches' primary/active/master controller.
Based on our current network architecture, our system depends solely on, in-band control 5 which implies the need for the switches to be able to demultiplex control and data plane traffic (i.e., via packet tagging).
Let G(X , L) be a symmetric directed graph such that X represents the set of association between a switch m and its reference controller n where n ∈ C, and L = {l 1 , . . . , l k } represents the associated link between a switch and a controller where k ∈ L. Although the associated link L is known in advance during network setup, we assume it can be removed in the cause of a link/node failure(dissociation). Also, it is assumed that every switch is actively associated with its reference controller (we denote this association as X a ) and passively associated with its slave controller (we denote this association as X p ). Hence, we define a failure event set F for node failure as F c = {f 1 , . . . , f ( C/2 )} and link failure as F l = {f 1, . . . , f c } such that F = {F c , F l }. Our main problem then focuses on the detection of failure and an efficient recovery model.
D. FAILURE DETECTION AND RECOVERY MODEL FORMULATION
For the rest of this paper, we refer to failure detection event as an indication that a failure (link/node) event has been triggered. Moreover, instead of differentiating between link and node failure, we show in Figure 3 (c) that if all the links connected to a controller (e.x., c1) fails, then it is assumed that the controller node has failed. Therefore, a failure detection event f = (m, n) indicates that either a link failure or total link failure to a controller node has occurred. The notation implies that our shim layer has detected a node failure at n due to response timeout during transmission from switch m or when their associated link k has failed. As such, we denote the association and dissociation of a switch-controller pair as follows:
X (m,n) = 0, if n is not associated with m 1, otherwise (an association exists)
When evaluating the failure detection event for a controller node n associated with switch m, we consider the worst-case scenario of a node failure, except for the case where n is the packet originating node. Then, we try to deliver the packet to switch m through another switch i (such that i ∈ S) with the same reference controller n. This we call a best-effort routing described in Section IV-B.
1) CONSTRAINT AND DECISION VARIABLES
Let the decision variables x k p , y k p mn and z p mn used in the following formulation to be defined as follows: 5 It is worth noting that controller to controller synchronization is disabled and our shim layer ensures consistency across the network via monitoring. where k symbolizes the link between a switch node m and controller node n, and β p mn represents the set of secondary path for a packet pkt sent from switch m to controller n after detecting a failure on the primary path. 
In the case where switch m is the originator of packet pkt sent to its reference controller n. If a link failure is detected on the primary path α p mn , then the packet is redirected through a secondary path β p mn via another switch i incident on the path. As a constraint, switch m must be an anchor 6 to the secondary path to reduce the latency incurred on packet delivery. 6 By anchor we refer to the switch from which the packet is being forwarded to the secondary path after a link failure has been detected.
So far, we have defined some of the key variables for our formulation. Next, we present our objective function as follows: (6) where w x , w y and w z represents the weighted constants assigned to each constraint to characterize the behavior of our objective function. For instance, in the event of a link failure on the primary path, the first term reduces the number of hops required for a packet to travel through the network. The second term reduces the length of the secondary path. The third term minimizes the combination of k links assigned to the secondary paths for a given flow (i.e., packets of the same flow share the same secondary path to enforce ordering).
Next, we set in place constraints to deactivate some links when evaluating the list of secondary paths for a given flow. Let the link reachability constraint be as follows:
Also, consider the following Bi-directional link reachability constraint:
In eq. (7), we modeled one of the possible paths in which a packet pkt can traverse between a switch and its reference controller. However, the use of this path may increase delivery latency or possible packet drop (i.e., higher than the set timeto-live of the packet). Hence, such a path needs to be removed from the list of secondary paths between the two nodes. Because of the bi-directionality of the links between nodes, we modeled the second constraint in eq. (8) to ensure that both the forward and backward path of the link is removed from the list of secondary paths for the node pair (m 1 , n 1 ). Let us now consider the link capacity constraint as follows:
The above constraint guarantees that the link capacity of any secondary path, for every possible link/node failure, is sufficient for both its primary flows (i.e., from nodes with this link as their primary link) and the new flows traversing the link from an anchor node (secondary flows). To further explain the delegation of this constraint, eq. (9) explicitly handles link failure scenarios whereas eq. (10) is specific for a controller node failure scenario. Besides, we ensure continuity of bi-directional flows for secondary paths by modeling the following bi-directional flow conservation constraints. 
The above equation (eq. (11)) ensures the continuity in the secondary paths assigned to a node pair {C, S} in the event of failure occurrence. To properly evaluate our objective function, we need to take into consideration the possibility of congesting the secondary link in the event of a link/node failure. Hence, we model a second objective function to prevent link congestion on a secondary reference path for a packet traveling from an anchor node m 2 to some destination node n 1 as follows. min (m 2 ,n 1 )
Lastly, we determine the communication cost incurred as a result of using the secondary path in the event of a link/node failure as the estimate of the distance between the anchor node and the destination node. Therefore, to compute the distance between an anchor node m and a destination node n, we consider an active association X a such that X a ∈ β p mn .
We then model the communication cost as follows:
where m 2 ∈ S and d m 2 ,n 1 ∈ β p mn (13) In a case where the primary link between a switch m 1 and its reference controller n 2 is severed, then packets exchange between the nodes will be required to traverse via a secondary path with the assumption that m 1 is an anchor node. We show in eq. (13), the communication cost of using a switch node m 2 to forward packets from the anchor node to the reference controller.
IV. SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE
In this section, we propose a proactive Fast-Failover Distributed Controller (FFDC) architecture that uses a decentralized approach for a link/node failure and recovery via rerouting. Following from our objective functions, we minimize the dependency on the controller, and also reduce the latency in recovery by abstracting our proposed technique on an augmented shim layer strategically placed at the center of communication between the control and data plane of the existing SDN architecture. We set up a virtual environment using hypervisor [15] and utilize the PLS shim layer in [2] as building blocks of our design. Our technique aims to eliminate packet loss and optimize the use of SDN controller(s) in failure detection and recovery without instigating modification on both the control plane and data plane of a typical SDN environment. Figure 8 shows the system architecture, and the various stages in the approach are described in the remaining part of this section. As a note, each controller is physically distributed with the FFDC, but the management interaction among the distributed shim layers are logically centralized. Another possible implementation of our shim layer would be to have a centralized shim layer to orchestrate the management of the network collaboratively with the controllers. This approach is only practical for controller instances. However, since our focus is for physically distributed controllers with logically centralized management, we default to the former. We categorize the architecture into three parts based on the color label in Figure 8 . We focus mainly on the Developed modules and extend our description to the Modified modules. While the Existing modules maintain their out-of-thebox functionality, our Developed modules require data paths labeled 1 − 6 in the architecture. Next, we highlight the key modules in our fast fail-over technique.
A. TRAFFIC MONITORING MODULE
The Traffic Monitoring Module (TMM) is one of the foundation modules in the proposed architecture. This module is used to monitor traffic between the control plane and the data plane. One of the most concerning part of this module is the functionality that ensures capture of only selected OpenFlow (OF) messages. Each monitoring condition entry includes a generic ID, datapath ID, action, and Time of Entry (TOE). The TOE is used to ensure the freshness of data in the monitoring table such that after every new condition entry, the previous entry referencing the same condition gets updated. The following steps summarize the behavior of our traffic monitoring module shown in Figure 9 .
1) UPDATE MONITORING CONDITION
The monitoring module generates and sends flow-stats request message for each monitoring flow entry to the reference switches via the statistic collection module at the beginning of each monitoring cycle. The reference switches then respond with a Flow-Stats Reply message. This message contains traffic information related to the flow entry. When adding a new entry during monitoring mode, the module sends a flow-mod message to the corresponding node entity. This message contains a match field set to the action in the condition entry; the action is configured to forward the message to OF controller interface with the lowest priority of 1. This priority level increases with the amount of flow captured by reference condition entry within a given TOE. However, an increase in latency can occur if the first packet of a new flow at the beginning of a traffic cycle is pushed on a failed link. To address this issue, we ensure a copy of the initial flow setup and redirection table is kept on our forwarding information table to provide an alternative lookup table.
Another important function of the traffic monitoring module is to ensure that conflicting updates are not duplicated in the table entry (i.e., a cascading error). To achieve duplicate avoidance, we state the following conditions:
• If there exists a matching field in the existing flow entry in the monitoring condition table, the entry in the flow  table takes precedence over the monitoring condition  table. • Conversely, if there exists a part of an existing flow entry matching the monitoring condition entry, the monitoring module generates a flow-mod message with the match field set to forward-controller instruction. The above condition eliminates any form of conflict between the two tables when adding a new monitoring condition to the table. However, these conditions do not entirely apply during the deletion of an entry from the monitoring condition table as a result of link/node failure.
2) REMOVE MONITORING CONDITION
In the event of a flow entry removal on a switch node due to time-to-live value (i.e., ttl = 0), a flow-removed message is sent to the reference controller node, which is also received by our traffic monitoring module. Hence, the flow entry is deleted following the update monitoring condition phase. However, only the flow table entry is deleted immediately while the monitoring condition table entry refreshes and removes the entry at the beginning of the next monitoring cycle. Furthermore, in a scenario whereby a monitoring condition entry is removed from the monitoring condition table, the monitoring module sends a Flow-Mod message to the reference OF switch to set the removal flag of the associated entry on the switch.
3) UPDATE CAPTURE CONDITION
This module decides which packet information to retain in the flow table based on a set of conditions. The condition VOLUME 7, 2019 structure includes a conditionID, datapathID, and condition, as shown in a behavioral example of the module in Figure 10 . When a new entry is added to the capture table, the traffic monitoring system generates a Flow-mod message to push a new flow entry into the OF switch in response to a previous packet_in request by the switch. However, since the action on the Flow-mod message sent to the OF switch is set to Forward Ref-CONTROLLER, then the packets matching the condition in the Flow-mod message is then forwarded to the controller. The shim layer then intercepts and processes the message and then sends a corresponding flow_mod to the switch with instructions on how to route the packet. Besides, the matching criterion utilized by the traffic monitoring service of our shim layer is explained as follows. If a part of an existing flow table entry matches a part of a new capture condition entry, the traffic monitoring module modifies the Flow-mod message from the controller based on the current flow table entry. However, because of the need for an explicit acknowledgment to the controller, the data plane switches can only run on Open vSwitch 1.6 and later to support bitwise matching forms [46] . This bitwise match forms apply only when dl_type = ethertype and nw_proto = proto (i.e., with their respective flags in OpenFlow) specify TCP. Hence, we can make use of the acknowledgment field significant in TCP protocol to request ACK from the data plane OVS switches.
B. FAILURE DETECTION MODULE
In the previous sub-section, we explained the internal dynamics of our Traffic Monitoring Module, which serves as the foundation module of the core of our system. In general, the detection time of failure in a network depends on the configuration of the switches, and this may further vary depending on the operational mode used by the control plane, as discussed in the previous section. Furthermore, we labeled the schematics of our fast fail-over flow in our architecture, as shown in Figure 8 (i.e., 1 to 6). We refer to this labeled information as connectors' 1 through 6. In this subsection, we focus on our Failure Detection Module and describe the process in which the module integrates with other modules via the connectors. As shown in the architecture, connector 1 sends traffic information to the Decision Support Module (DSM), which then processes the information and forwards them accordingly. Our decision support module is similar to our model in [3] with some modifications to extend its functionality to support our failure detection system. Algorithm 1 shows our Failure Detection Module (FDM) that utilizes the output from the Decision Support Module. The FDM then checks for three conditions referred collectively to as Best Effort Routing namely;
• Link Congestion: When the link between two nodes is congested, packets exchanged between the nodes can be delayed. If the time to process such a packet exceeds the ttl counter, then TMM assumes a failure event has occurred, and as such, it forwards the information to Algorithm 1 Failure Detection Module 1: Condition: Secondary paths have been computed during topology discovery and Forwarding Information Table updated for each flow entry. 2: Objective: To identify if the failure event is associated with a link or a reference controller node.
3: Input:
F : Failure_event(p k ) P mn associated link information C : associated controller node information β p mn associated secondary path 4: Output: −1 : link congestion (action: send to connector 3) 0 : link failure detected (action: send to connector 4) 1 : node failure (action: send to connector 4) 5: Initialize F = G(X , L) where X = {m, n} and L = {α p mn , β p mn } 6: Check if the associated path is a primary path 7: while P mn = α p mn do 8:
Check for link congestion where µ mn tcap = 80% 9:
if µ mn < µ mn tcap then 10:
Get sec_path(m, n) 12:
Check if multiple secondary paths exist 13:
if sec_path > 1 then following eq. (6) 14:
path_election(β p mn ) 15:
SwitchPath(dpid) 16:
α p mn = β p mn 17:
Update(α p mn ) 18:
Check update success of FIT 19:
if Update = success then 20:
send flow_mod to reference node 21:
return 0 22: else 23:
No secondary path available (Node Failure) 24:
return 1 25:
end if 26:
else if sec_path = 0 then 27:
SwitchPath(dpid) 28:
α p mn = β p mn 29:
Update(α p mn ) 30:
end if 31:
else if µ mn = µ mn tcap then 32:
return −1 33: end if 34: end while the DSM. However, since the DSM can only classify and forward information to the respective module, hence, on reaching the FDM, if it returns −1 then the action appended to the packet is changed to Forward Connector_3.
• Link Failure: In the event of a link failure, the FDM checks for the secondary path associated with that primary path and then appends the new path to the information forwarded to connector 4 (i.e., update module). However, if multi-paths exist in the secondary path for the failed link, then an election process is initiated to determine which secondary link is most suitable following from eqs. (7) to (10) and section III-C.
• Node Failure: To differentiate between a link and node failure, we assume that when all the links associated with a reference controller is unavailable, then it can be assumed that such a node has failed. In the next traffic cycle, the Topology Discovery Module confirms the node failure. Otherwise, the node is considered available and the Forwarding Information Table ( FIT) reverts to the previous entry before failure detection update. 7
C. UPDATE MODULE
The update module handles the interaction between our functional modules and the FIT to ensure consistency in flow table updates. Also, the flow update module can change the priority set in the flow path information based on the failure scenario. We focused on two cases, which are node failure recovery and link failure recovery. In the first case, if node failure is detected by the FDM, which then sends information regarding this failure to the Load Balancing Module (LBM), the LBM then decides on how to distribute the overall system workload among the other controllers. Then, the new workload distribution is sent to the Update Module, which changes the priority on the task to ensure that all the required changes are made in the FIT before running the next task update. Again, this is to ensure consistency updates in the FIT.
In the second case, if the FDM detects a link failure, it sends recovery information to update the primary path with the selected secondary path (i.e., in case of multiple secondary paths) that has the lowest communication overhead following from eq. (13). During the next traffic cycle, the Forwarding Path Computation Module (FPCM) commits the entry in FIT. Besides, during the start of every traffic cycle, FPCM utilizes its secondary path computation submodule described in algorithm 2 (see Appendix A) to compute and update new/broken secondary links.
D. FORWARDING INFORMATION TABLE
Our FIT implementation follows a tree-like data structure logically divided into two tables, namely, Routing Information Base and Forwarding Information Base (FIB). It follows the design of the ORTC algorithm proposed in [16] with some modification to include computational aggregation of flow entries from our functional modules. To ensure optimality 7 The update process is committed at the start of every traffic cycle to reduce the overhead caused by modifying the FIT when the failure is just temporary.
in FIB size and strong forward correctness, we define the following update operations on our table.
• Ancestry Root: Each binary tree requires a root candidate dependent upon by the leave nodes. Therefore, at the start of the first topology discovery, the Forward Path Computation updates the FIT, and a root entry is selected at random. Although, after subsequent traffic cycle update, the root node becomes the most frequently hit in the FIT. Hence, it reduces the amount of time required to access frequent entry. Furthermore, using the top-k approach, we can reduce the access time of the most frequent entry to our best case of O(1).
• Descendants Candidate: The descendants of a root entry (i.e., sub-tree or main root) will be updated whenever the root entry is updated. Also, if the root entry is removed, the most frequently accessed descendant of that sub-tree becomes the new root candidate.
• Affected Ancestor: Starting from the parent of a prefix, if a new route is computed for an existing leaf entry, all ancestral prefixes pointers need to be updated.
• Prefix: To ensure consistency and reduce latency in accessing flow table entries, prefix updates are accessible during the current traffic cycle but committed only at the beginning of the next traffic cycle.
• Aggregate Prefix: To reduce the size of the flow table significantly, and compress partially matching entries (i.e., based on fields from packets used to match against flow entries shown in Table 3 ), we adopt an aggregate scheme for the prefixes based on the following conditions: (i) if the entry is duplicated in another leaf node, and (ii) if the access frequency is minimal as compared to other entries (i.e., as shown in Figure 11 ).
V. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
We evaluated the proposed technique using four different network topologies, namely, Internet 2 OS3E with 35 nodes (OS3E-35) [24] , and Internet Topology Zoo's ATT North America with 25 nodes, BT Asia-Pacific with 20 nodes and BT Europe network with 24 nodes [29] . We used simulations to demonstrate the resilience of our prototype to failure events. We first validated the FFDC architecture presented in Section IV with the simulation result. On the data plane, we implemented the topology on the long-term support version of Open vSwitch (2.5.9). We then compare the communication latency incurred by FFDC with Floodlight High Availability, logically distributed controller represented as DC.
Our choice of SDN controller is based on the following; programming language, use of standard protocol and models, multi-thread high-performance capability, and the ease of setup with minimal dependencies. Based on our criteria, two of the conventional open-source controllers were selected, namely, ONOS [8] and Floodlight [17] . Although ONOS is a newer controller architecture as compared to Floodlight, it operates as a cluster of identical nodes in terms of the software stack. This mode of operation makes it difficult to establish a collaborative management control with a nonnative software stack. Because the proposed shim layer architecture is not intended for RSMs, we eliminated ONOS as our controller of choice.
As part of our future consideration for the project, we plan to implement a more flexible management framework to allow open integration with different OF controllers. An additional feature offered by the Floodlight SDN controller is its multi-thread capability to support the distributed controller environment needed for the proposed shim layer.
Further, well-written documentation on the controller modules makes it easy to turn off modules that are not required. Hence an improved performance resulting from the efficient resource utilization in the control plane. Also, the project floodlight community has been beneficial in offering support when needed.
We briefly describe the simulation environment. The amount of load sent to the controllers from the switches is randomly generated from ranges of 200K /s to 400K /s requests with a uniform packet size of 160 bytes [26] . We provision the testbed with a minimum of 2 to a maximum of 7 floodlight controllers (i.e., the minimum size of a distributed environment is 2 controllers). The amount of packet processing capability of each floodlight controller is set to 2800K packets per second on a 1Gbit/s network pipeline. The distributed controller environment is hosted on four 64 − bit servers, each containing 4-cores from Xeon E3-1200 processors and one Intel Xeon E5-2630 processor with a total of 128GB per box. Each topology is divided into edge nodes (generating traffic) and core nodes (routing traffic) for simplicity. We implemented OpenVirtX0.0-MAINT [5] to act as the network hypervisor and D-ITG [6] in multi-thread mode to generate traffic.
We first verify that our secondary path computation algorithm in Appendix A can correctly create backup paths for each link to ensure failure recovery on primary links. We then verify that the update process for the backup path is consistent with the traffic monitoring module. We show the testbed environment in Figure 12 , where the virtual link between c4 and s8 is severed in the physical network. Once FFDC realizes this link failure after a specified timeout period, the FDM updates the FIT to select the secondary path based on the priority among the existing set of paths available (i.e., β p mn ). However, since the only available secondary path to the failed link is through s5, then the new primary path for packets traveling from s6 to c4 is assigned a new path shown by the arrow (i.e., s6 − − > s5 − − > c4). As a result, we minimize the amount of generated Flow_Mod messages and reduce the amount of latency incurred as a result of the failure. Figure 13 shows the performance comparison between DC and FFDC based on the testbed shown in Figure 12 . Figure 13(a) shows the latency measurement incurred by s6 − c4 as a result of the failed link (i.e., obtained from ping result) while (b) shows the amount of Flow_Mod generated as a result of the failure. From both view graphs, it shows that our system incurred 50% less downtime as compared to DC and a 75% reduction in Flow_Mod generated from the time of failure to network recovery (i.e., after the primary path default to a secondary path). Next, we discuss the remaining part of the results obtained to investigate the efficiency of our scheme further.
A. INTER-CONTROLLER LATENCY
It is worth to mention that the impact of using the out-ofthe-box synchronization among distributed controllers could incur considerable communication overhead as a result of the chatty nature of controllers. We compare the average communication latency incurred as a result of inter-controller synchronization enabled in DC with the per-need based synchronization provided by FFDC, as shown in Figure 14 . It can be inferred that FFDC achieved a desirable reduction of about half the latency incurred by using DC in the absence of any failure event. By minimizing the congestion on the communication link (subject to eq. (12)), we can ensure efficient information flow given the global network. This can be attributed to the refined nature of our architecture in ensuring that only core information is exchanged with the controllers (i.e., percontroller specific information), which consequently maintains global consistency enforced by FFDC.
Furthermore, we discovered that the increase in the number of controllers within the distributed environment does not necessarily impact the amount of latency incurred as compared to the number of switch nodes. This can be attributed to the number of Flow-Mods required for different topologies in the event of a failure. On both schemes, we inferred that the amount of switch nodes present in the network is directly proportional to the latency incurred during a failure event. Hence, it is evident that across the four different network topology, the average latency incurred by DC is twice the amount incurred by FFDC.
B. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION ACROSS LINK/NODE FAILURE
Concerning the two failure models illustrated in Figure 3 (a), (b), and (c), we set up a simulation environment to measure the performance of our system during a single link failure event, and a total link failure event (i.e., node failure). Following from our first objective function in eq. (6), we varied the value of the weighted constants w x , w y , w z from 100 to 200 to characterize the behavior of our scheme. Our concern is towards minimizing the magnitude of communication latency involved, along with the increasing number of link failures. Therefore, we show in Figure 15 the comparison between single link failure and a total link failure during failure recovery, and we concluded that the difference in latency between the two scenarios is not a factor of their failure. In a smaller testbed shown in Figure 13 , the number of flow-mod messages required in the event of a single link failure is localized (i.e., only affect reference network elements) until the next traffic cycle. Which explains the similarity in the amount of flow-mod messages exchanged both during single link failure and total link failure. Hence, the localization concept enhances the effectiveness of our scheme to minimize global latency upon failure detection.
C. SCHEME PERFORMANCE COMPARISON WITH BASELINE
For further illustration, we show in Figure 16 the comparison of the worst-case latency incurred on both schemes in three scenarios (i.e., no failure, single and total link failure). To minimize the worst-case scenario subject to eqs. (7) to (11) , we adapted each topology to our scheme by making some adjustments to the placement of each switch (i.e., each switch directly connects to its reference controller). Also, we enable the load balancing module from [3] to ensure that in the case of a controller node failure, the loadbalancer will initiate a controller role change request on the affected switches. We observed that on all the topology, the latency incurred by our scheme converges with the subsequent increase in the number of controllers in contrast to the DC scheme. This is because we set the highest value for the last term in our objective function in eq. (6) to force packets from the same flow to traverse the same path upon a link failure event. Also, this ensures that packets are not dropped as a result of timeout count (i.e., since the window size of TCP protocol increases with an increase in provisional bandwidth) which follows from our Extended Resource Fair Share Theorem (see Appendix B implemented on the load balancing module described in our previous work.
Finally, it is interesting to note how the FFDC scheme ensures efficient resource usage while maintaining a consistent view (i.e., local view during a traffic cycle and global view at the beginning of a traffic cycle) on the individual controller within the control plane in the absence of controller to controller synchronization.
D. NETWORK CONVERGENCE EVALUATION
We further explore the efficiency of FFDC for the convergence time of the network and then compare it with an idealized Paxos consensus algorithm [32] . Where reaching consensus requires that the majority of the distributed controllers receive and acknowledge a message without experiencing any latency. We evaluated the two approaches based on our simulation environment with the properties described in Table 4 . We used three topology, AS1239 and AS1221 as mapped by [58] , and a 16 − ary fat-tree data center topology. Both controller applications implement a shortest-path routing algorithm.
1) SINGLE-LINK FAILURE
In this experiment, we measure the time taken by the network to converge to the shortest path routes in the event of a single link failure. The main question addressed is how long does it take for the network to reach optimal utilization? An SDN is at its optimal utilization if; (i) all the reference switches have converged to a state in which reference packets are routed through the shortest path, (ii) all controllers are aware of the link failure event, and (iii) every controllers' view of the network is updated in accordance to the physical configuration installed on the switches. We measure the convergence time to optimal utilization by failing random links, and show the cumulative distributed functions in Figures 17(a) , 17(b) , and 17(c). The results show compelling evidence that with FFDC, the network converges to its optimal utilization significantly faster than the ideal Paxos. Although with Paxo, the replicated logs inform on when the controllers have reached a consensus state, however, there is no optimization for how long it takes the controllers to reach optimal utilization. Hence, it is hard to quantify the recovery period under different failure scenarios as compared to FFDC, which uses a precomputed secondary path.
2) NETWORK CONNECTIVITY
We compare the general availability of physically connected host pairs based on the current physical configuration. We run a 7hrs simulation with randomly generated link failure and recovery events on AS1221 topology using both Paxos controlled RSM and FFDC controlled physically distributed Floodlight controllers. The result in Figure 17(d) shows a comparable availability in both cases. Although FFDC shows a slightly higher availability than Paxos, different results should be expected with different topologies. Therefore, the availability of host pairs under rapid link failure and recovery events is partly determined by the level of connectivity in the network.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have presented a new failure recovery management scheme for a distributed SDN controller environment and a mathematical modeling approach to leverage the capabilities of our shim layer. We have further shown that the bias towards using an in-band controlled network to design a fault-tolerant network in SDN can be overturned with a collaborative shim layer serving as a semi-management layer. The FFDC extends link failure to the possibility of a controller node failure in the presence of total link failure. The system is based on the idea that, in the event of failure detection, updates can be made to the FIT on the fly without necessarily updating all the network elements at that instance. Instead, our scheme uses a traffic cycle threshold to commit updates to the FIT table such that each traffic cycle is bounded by the number of flow events in the network. To minimize the amount of latency involved in flow setup, and also to ensure a zero packet loss, FFDC keeps a copy of requests during a traffic cycle and purges this request at the beginning of the next cycle. Therefore, our scheme substantially presents failure-tolerant control architecture without sacrificing efficiency or sustain a significant trade-off on network performance. We tested FFDC with a DC baseline (based on OpenFlow fast failover module) on four well-known topologies, and comparative results were obtained to show the effectiveness of our scheme over the classic DC scheme. We further compared FFDC with other state-of-the-art systems under different scenarios to extend the generality of our technique. We are currently working on solving the same problem with a linearized algorithm, and further, develop more testing scenarios to increase the scope of our work for performance evaluation.
APPENDIX A ALGORITHM FOR CALCULATING SECONDARY PATH
It is worthy of noting that for our fast-failover technique to efficiently initiate secondary path entries in place of failed primary paths, we introduce our secondary path computation algorithm as a sub-module of Forwarding Path Computation Module(FPCM). Algorithm 2 is used to calculate the secondary path of a link in the event of failure. The secondary paths are generated for both forward and reverse routing. The primary path created in line 6 is based on the Dijkstra shortest path algorithm. Also, line 9 ensures that a primary link computed by topology discovery during a previous traffic cycle is not included in the list of the secondary path for a new traffic cycle.
APPENDIX B EXTENDED RESOURCE FAIR SHARING ALGORITHM
In this section, we discuss the extended version of our Resource Fair Sharing Algorithm from [3] in Theorem 1 and Theorem 2. We addressed two scenarios with our resource fair sharing theorem: Scenario 1: An overloaded controller. We leverage the global workload-balancing functionality of our proactive load Algorithm 2 Secondary Path Computation Algorithm 1: Condition: After network initialization, virtual link required for FPCM have been created. 2: Objective: To preemptively calculate secondary path for associated links between a switch and its reference controller. 3: Input Source Address: Src Destination Address: Dst Primary Path: α p mn 4: Output Secondary path: P m,n Secondary list: β p mn 5: Initialize Src := null Dst := null P m,n := null β p mn := null 6: α p mn := ComputeShortestPath(Src, Dst) 7: k := 0 #for some link k ∈ L 8: L := α p mn #where L = links and mn = k for nodes(m, n) 9: while L = Empty do 10:
newSrc := L(k).getSrcSwitch 11:
netDst := L(k).getDstSwitch 12:
midPath := ComputeShortestPath(newSrc, newDst) 13:
α p mn .remove(k) 14:
update.P m,n := α p mn .add(k, midPath) 15:
L.remove(k) 16:
β p mn .add(P m,n ) 17:
k := k + 1 18: end while balancing technique in [3] to shift the controller's load to other controllers following a strict requirement. By ensuring close to optimal workload balancing in our DC-SDN, we implement the constraint in Theorem 1, Scenario 2: A controller node failure. For optimal functionality of our system, the proactive load balancing technique effectively distributes the workload (i.e., associated switches to the failed controller) to other controllers within our distributed environment. Hence, Theorem 2 addresses the possibility of overloading another controller after load shift by implementing a constraint to monitor the amount of workload per the controller's resource capacity.
Theorem 1 (Resources Fair Share): In a matching resource fair sharing θ of a group of controllers in a DC-SDN G(X , L), the initial load C load r of the load shift receiver to the previously overloaded controller C load s must be such that the new load for the previously overloaded controller (NC load s ) is equal to or slightly less than the new load for the receiving controller (NC load r ). Hence the following equation: Theorem 2 (Resources Fair Share): In a matching resource fair sharing θ of a group of controllers in a DC-SDN G(X , L), the difference in the initial load C load r of the load shift receiver to its load after load shifting denoted by NC r load must not be more than 10% of its initial load in the event of a load failure following our equation: 
